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March 01, 2010 (Vol. 30, No. 5)

ACLU Takes on Patent Office & Myriad Genetics

Federal Judge Hears Arguments about Gene Patents for BRCA

  • On February 2, Judge Robert M. Sweet at the U.S. District Court in Manhattan heard oral arguments in the case of Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al.

    In this case, filed May 12, 2009, the plaintiffs are: Association for Molecular Pathology, American College of Medical Genetics, American Society for Clinical Pathology, College of American Pathologists, Breast Cancer Action, Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, and certain gene researchers and individuals potentially affected by breast cancer. The lawyers for plaintiffs are with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Public Patent Foundation. The named defendants are: United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Myriad Genetics, and the directors of the University of Utah Research Foundation.

    Concerned citizens and reporters swamped the courthouse in response to the ACLU’s mass mailings about the case and free screenings of “In The Family,” a documentary film on breast cancer that the ACLU has used as a platform to garner public support for this lawsuit.

    The oral arguments heard by Judge Sweet were for the ACLU’s motion for summary judgment that the claims in seven U.S. patents covering BRCA genes associated with breast cancer are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (the IP clause) of the U.S. Constitution as well as the First Amendment.

    The legal arguments also involved Myriad Genetics’ countermotion for summary judgment in its favor and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) motion to dismiss the constitutional claims directed against it.

    The humanities-oriented lawyers of the ACLU and counsel for the science-oriented defendants vehemently supported their differing positions on the meaning, scope, and implications of the patent claims in question. The process seemed to embody C.P. Snow’s famous theory of The Two Cultures, on the communications breakdown between the humanities and sciences.

    Chris Hansen, an ACLU lawyer, opened with assertions that the “isolated DNA” recited in certain of the patent claims in question is not markedly different from DNA as it exists in the body and accordingly is simply a “product of nature.” Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1948 case of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., Hansen said that a patent cannot be granted for “one of the ancient secrets of nature now disclosed.”

    Hansen analogized isolated DNA to gold extracted from a mine and emphasized that, while counsel for Myriad has argued that isolation of DNA is a complex process, the end result is still a DNA sequence made not by man, but by nature.

    Apparently borrowing from copyright law, Chris Hansen averred that patents are not awarded for effort. This principle of copyright law is rooted in Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that information compiled in a telephone directory does not constitute copyright-protectable creative expression.

    Hansen argued that the method claims of the patents violate the First Amendment because they appear to cover the mere act of looking at one sequence of letters and another sequence of letters and thinking about or saying whether they appear to be the same. This, Hansen said, stifles the sharing of information between researchers who, without this obstacle, would be able to build upon existing research and potentially develop cures or treatments for BRCA1- and BRCA2-related cancer.

    Under this reasoning, the patents do not “Promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” under the intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution.

    Sandra Park, also with the ACLU, discussed Diamond v. Chakrabarty, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1980 that claims to a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down oil recited subject matter eligible for patent protection. She also briefly summarized the  Funk Brothers v. Kalo case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims to mixtures of naturally occurring bacteria that could extract nitrogen from the air were products of nature, and thus not patent-eligible under section 101 of the patent law.

    Additionally, she mentioned American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex in which the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1931 that claims to fruit with a skin or rind that contains mold-resistant borax does not qualify as an “article of manufacture” under section 101. Park said that these cases clearly show that section 101 is satisfied only when the claimed subject matter has useful properties that it did not have in its natural form.

    Park echoed Hansen’s assertions as to the purported insignificance of a DNA sequence being “isolated” and argued that the venerable Judge Learned Hand was wrong in concluding in the 1911 case of Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co. that isolated and purified adrenaline is patent-eligible subject matter in light of its commercial utility. To buttress this position, Park said that Chakrabarty, Funk Brothers, and American Fruit Growers impliedly overruled the Parke-Davis case.

    In arguing against the validity of the method claims in the patents in suit, Park cited the recent case of In re Bilski, wherein the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) held that a claimed process is patentable if “ it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”

    Park asserted that neither prong of the test is met by the method claims in the disputed patents, because no particular machine is recited and because comparing one DNA sequence to another does not involve a transformation of an article into a different state or thing. Park sought to distinguish the claims at issue from those in Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo, where the CAFC recently held that method claims for measuring the level of a drug in a blood sample involved a transformation under the “machine or transformation” test of the Bilski case.

    Park said that in Prometheus, the claims included a first step of administering a drug to a subject, which induced a chemical transformation that is necessary for subsequently determining the level of the drug in a blood sample taken from the subject and that, by contrast, no transformative step is necessary for comparing one DNA sequence to another.

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